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V~rsions of Imitation in the Renaissance 
From Petrarch's sonnets to Milton's epics a major 
characteristic of Renaissance literature is the imitation of earlier 
texts, and the Renaissance contains a vast and perplexing array of 
writings on the theory and practice of imitation. 1 Although these 
writings often exhaust themselves in vindictive and ferocious ad 
hominem polemics -- one need only recall Julius Caesar Scaliger's 
Orationes against Erasmus and dwell at length over what now 
appears to many a sterile and fruitless debate whether or not Cicero 
should be the only model for Latin prose, these treatises on imitation 
can offer considerable guidance for the interpretation of Renaissance 
literature. The theories of imitation help structure one's 
expectations as to the types of relations between text and model 
which one is likely to find, although they also amount to a strong 
warning against the difficulties of discovering and analyzing these 
relations. 
Once one turns to writings on llmitation, one is immediately 
struck by a bewildering variety of positions. Besides constant 
reference to imitatio, some treatises appear to have little else in 
common. Erasmus, Ramus, and Johannes Thomas Freigius, for example, 
all wrote works entitled Ciceronianus; tl:1ey could hardly differ more. 
Erasmus' dialogue caricatures extreme Ciceronianism, contains 
important reflections on imitation and historical change, and 
concludes with a catalogue which assesses the styles of numerous 
Latin authors from Cicero's day to Erasmus'. Ramus briefly 
2 
discusses imitation in a manner similar to Erasmus', but the bulk of 
his work treats the imitation of Cicero's entire career as the surest 
way to become vir bonus dicendi peritus and emphasizes character-
formation. Freigius' work is devoted to inventio, the discovery and 
classification of commonplaces. 
Writers discuss imitation from so many different points 
of view: as a path to the sublime ("Longinus"), as a 
reinforcement of one's natural inclinations (Poliziano) or a 
substitute for undesirable inclinations (Cortesi), as a method for 
enriching one's writing with stylistic gems (Vida), as the surest 
or only way to learn Latin (Delminio), as providing the competitive 
stimulus necessary for achievement (Calcagnini), and as a means 
of "illustrating" a vulgar language (Du Bellay). I do not 
intend this list to limit an author to only one position, nor does 
it exhaust all the positions taken during antiquity and the 
Renaissance. And I have intentionally excluded discussions of 
literary representation deriving from Plato and Aristotle, although 
they also go by the name of imitation and even though this more 
philosophical tradition often mingles with the rhetorical theories 
about models, as in the cases of Phoebammon and Giovanfrancesco 
Pico della Mirandola. 
3 
Consequently the common distinction between philosophical 
and rhetorical imitation is somewhat misleading because it obscures 
the distinctions among the varieties of rhetorical imitation. 2 
Occasionally theorists appear to recognize distinct moments or 
versions of imitatio, but to my knowledge only Bartolomeo Ricci, in 
his De imitatione, first published in 1541, writes as if there were 
accepted divisions of the genus imitatio into species. Ricci is about 
to discuss, at length, Virgil's emulation, in his treatment of Dido, 
of Catullus 1 Ariadne, but prefaces his remarks with the request that 
no one accuse him of ignorance because 
I attribute to imitation that which belongs to emulation. For 
although following, imitating, and emulating are three entirely 
3 different species, they are similar and do belong to one class. 
Despite this gesture towards a tripartite imitatio -- sequi, imitari, 
aemulari Ricci makes no effort to use the concepts precisely; 
one often feels the choice of a term is dictated only by elegant 
variation. 
Even though no other Renaissance theorist explicitly 
discusses species of imitation, one can identify Ricci's three species 
by studying the imagery, analogies, and metaphors of writings on 
imitation. The distinctions are most accessible in the metaphoric 
contrasts and comparisons which a theorist adopts to illustrate his 
position. Very often Ricci's three classes collapse into two, an 
opposition between imitation and emulation in which case imitating and 
following are not distinguished. Thus the two major categories of 
imitation are imitation (imitatio) and emulation (aemulatio). 4 
These analogies, images, and metaphors fall into 
three general classes, which I shall call transformative, 
dissimulative, and eristic. These classes do not strictly 
4 
correlate with the three types of imitation. The transformative class 
includes apian, digestive, filial, and simian metaphors. Bees 
illustrate not only transformative imitation, but nontransformative 
following, gathering, or borrowing. Digestion and the resemblance 
of father to son represent successful transformations of a model; 
the ape and also the crow represent failures of transformation. 
Dissimulative imagery and explicit advice of dissimulation refer to 
concealing or disguising the relation between text and model. The 
doctrines conveyed by these two classes pose serious problems for 
the interpreter who tries to understand imitations and allusions 
because they advise the effacement of resemblance between text and 
model. Eristic metaphors -- I borrow the term from "Longinus' " 
description of Plato's wrestling with Homer and citation of Hesiod's 
agathe eris often support a doctrine which contradicts the advice 
of effacement: an open struggle with the model for preeminence, a 
struggle in which the model must be recognized to assure the text's 
victory. Besides images of struggle, strife, and competition, the 
eristic class includes a large group of analogies connected with 
overtaking and passing people on roads or paths, in particular 
footsteps and leaders. Eristic metaphors justify the interpreter's 
5 
attempt to understand resemblances between texts as allusions, suggest 
that a text may criticise and correct its model, and reveal a 
persistent ambivalence in emulation (which may also be called eristic 
imitation): admiration for a model joined with envy and contentious-
5 
ness. 
I 
6 Because of the work of Gmelin and von Stackelberg the apian 
metaphor (Bienengleichnis) is probably the most familiar of all the 
images in writings on imitation. More importantly, the apian metaphor 
is perhaps the most misleading topos because it is used to present two 
opposed conceptions of imitation: the poet as collector (following) 
and the poet as maker (imitation or emulation). The apian metaphor is 
not always transformative. The digression into natural history in 
Seneca's epistulae morales 84, a central text for all later discussions 
of imitation, is essential. Seneca says that investigators are not 
positive whether the bees collect honey from flowers or change what 
they gather into honey by some process of their own. Their skill 
may lie in gathering, not in in making. Once, however, Seneca 
strengthens his advice to imitate the bees with another image of 
transformation, digestion, one realizes that he is arguing for 
transformative imitation, not merely eclectic gathering. The bees 
convert flowers into honey by a process, for my purposes and I suspect 
Seneca's in this letter, similar to digestion in men. 
Macrobius appears to be the fi.rst author to assume that the 
crucial point of Seneca's apian metaphor is not the bees' ability to 
transform pollen into honey, but their collecting pollen 
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from different flowers. Since Petrarch, it has been customary to 
criticize the discrepancy between the theory and practice of 
imitation in Macrobius, who certainly does excerpt large portions of 
Seneca's letter without acknowledgment or substantial transformation. 7 
For Macrobius, however, imitation does not imply avoiding verbal 
repetition, a cardinal position in Petrarch and other later authors, 
b . f . . 1 8 ut a rearrang1ng o prev1ous mater1a • Despite his adoption of 
Seneca's apian and digestive metaphors in language that insists on 
making something new and different, Macrobius is more concerned with 
reducing a mass of material into a useful order. 
And I have not gathered things worth remembering into a confused 
heap. Rather, a variety of matters from different authors and 
times has been arranged, as it were, into a body so that what I 
had noted indiscriminately and without distinction as an aid to 
memory would coherently come together into an orderly arrangement 
[in ordinem] like parts of the body. (1. pr. 3) 
Seneca's digestive analogy supports an imitation which 
completely transforms the model to produce something with its own 
identity. Macrobius inserts Seneca's analogy into his preface with 
only insignificant variations until he reaches "lest it belong to 
someone else," where he makes an addition which reverses Seneca's 
position: 
We should produce the same effect with things that nourish the 
mind. We should not allow what we have consumed to stay intact, 
lest it belong to someone else; instead it should be digested 
7 
into some sort of arrangement [in quandam digeriem concoquantur]. 
(l.pr. 7) 
Despite the ambiguity of digeries, I think Macrobius is using it as 
Lewis and Short define it, citing this passage, "an orderly distribution, 
a disposition, arrangement"; in digeriem is synonymous with in ordinem. 
Macrobius is concerned with organization, not with transformation; he 
adds in ordinem to another passage he reworks from Seneca: "I too 
will entrust whatever I have sought in my diverse reading to my pen so 
that under its direction my reading may coalesce into an orderly 
arrangement [in ordinem]." This coalesc:ing is not the transformation 
of pollen :into honey, in which the pollen loses its ident:ity and 
becomes something else, but the red:isposition of :ind:ividual excerpts 
:in an organized collect:ion, a florilegiur~. Nacrobius conceives of 
imitation as a type of red:istributive reproduction; for him making 
something different means setting it in a new context. 
Macrobius offers an unusually complex example of the confusion 
of two opposed types of :imitation inherent in the apian metaphor. 
Ordinarily one finds the flower-gathering and honey-making moments of 
imitation in different contexts. Poliz:iano's quotation of Lucretius 
offers two nontransforrnative uses of the apian metaphor: 
Since it is a very great fault to intend to imitate only one 
person, we shall not err if we place before us as models 
Quintilian and Statius as well as Cicero and Virgil, if we take 
from everywhere what we can use, as in Lucretius, "just as the 
bees taste everything in the flowering pastures, we likewise feed 
on all Epicurus' golden sayings': 9 
8 
In the proem to his third book Lucretius 1 simile asserts his dependence 
on Epicurus and refuses aemulatio. Lucretius pictures himself as 
gathering wisdom from his spiritual father, not as modifying what he reads. 
Collecting doc trine from all of Epicurus is the point of the comparison. In 
this passage Poliziano, strictly speaking, is only utilizing the aspect of 
gathering from everywhere, althoug~ elsewhere he disapproves of imitation 
without emulation and insists, by digestive metaphor, on transformative 
imitation~0 Here, however, his primary concern is to justify his 
choice of Quintilian and Statius as worthy of study although inferior 
to Cicero and Virgil. Poliziano is arguing for eclectic imitation, 
11 the study and use of all good authors. 
One need not dwell on the transformative application of the 
apian metaphor since von Stachelberg provides so many examples. One 
can sum it up with one sentence from Petrarch: "Take care that what 
you have gathered does not long remain in its original form inside of 
you: the bees would not be glorious H they did not convert what they 
found into something different and something oetter 11 (Fam. 1,8,23), 
The emphasis on transformation is complete; what's gathered must 
become something different. 
In Seneca the apian and digestive metaphors reinforce one 
another and are closely analogous. The digestive metaphor has just 
as long a history as the apian, but, with the exception of Cortesi, 
who uses it as an argument against eclecticism (indigestion from 
t . d . ff t f d h . ) 12 i 1 d ea 1ng too many 1 eren oo s at t e same t1me , s a ways use 
to support transformative imitation. After Seneca, one finds it in 
Quintilian, Macrobius, Petrarch, Poliziano, Erasmus, Calcagnini, 
Dolet, Florida, Du Bellay, Sidney, and Jonson; 13· I quote one of 
Erasmus' versions of the topos as representative: 
9 
I approve an imitation that is not limited to one model from who:>e 
features one does not dare to depart, an imitation which excerpt:> 
from all authors, or at any rate from the most eminent, what is 
excellent in each and most suits one's intellect, and which does 
not at once fasten to a discourse whatever beauty it lights upon,, 
but which transfers what it finds into the mind itself, as into 
the stomach, so that transfused into the veins it appears to be 
a birth of one's intellect, not something begged and borrowed from 
elsewhere, and breathes forth the vigor and disposition of one's 
mind and nature, so that the reader does not recognize an insert:lon 
taken from Cicero, but a child born from one's brain, just as 
they say Pallas was born form Jupiter's, bearing a lively image 
of its parent, and also so that one's discourse does not appear 
to be some sort of cento or mosaic, but an image breathing forth 
one's mind or a river flowing from the fountain of one's heart. 11' 
Although certain elements of this long sentence are peculiar to 
Erasmus' conception of imitation, one can justly call it a representative 
instance of the digestive topos for several reasons. First, the 
metaphors which theorists of imitation use do not appear as incidental 
ornaments; they usually carry the burden of what the theorist has to 
say and come at the crucial moments of his argument. In this passage 
Bulephorus, after having ridiculed extreme Ciceronianism and having 
argued for eclecticism, is stating his O'iVIl conception of imitation. 
All of Erasmus' major concerns appear here with the exception of the 
fear that Ciceronianism is a disguise for paganism, and even this is 
10 
implicit in the reference to decorum ("suits one's intellect"), for 
as I argue elsewhere, historical decorum, which forbids the use of 
exclusively pagan terms in Christian contexts, because the terms are 
inappropriate to the changed historical conditions, is the central 
15 
concept of the Ciceronianus. This sentence also states a preference 
for eclectic rather than Ciceronian imitation and reveals Erasmus' 
insistence, unusual in treatises on imitation, on sincere expression 
of the author's personality as an essential of good writing. The 
passage is also typical -- one need only think of Seneca's ep. mar. 
84 -- of the way in which imitative metaphors come in clusters. Besides 
the digestive metaphor one finds references to mosaics and begging, and 
a child/parent comparison, all traditional, although Erasmus uses the 
filial image unlike Seneca, Petrarch, and Cortesi. 16 Finally, 
Erasmus thoroughly emphasizes transformation through digestion; a 
reader will not even recognize Cicero as model. 
With the reader's lack of recognition a new class of 
imitative imagery and doctrine appears: dissimulation. Theorists 
often regard transformation as the means to the end of dissimulation, 
just as Erasmus does in this sentence. In a certain sense this advice 
is nothing more than an extension of the adage ars est celare artem to 
imitation, as in Erasmus: 
Did not Cicero himself teach that the chief point of art is to 
disguise [dissimulare] art? •• Therefore if we wish to 
imitate Cicero successfully, we must above all disguise our 
imitation of Cicero. (p. 84 ) 
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Since scholars have not paid much attention to the persistent 
advice to disguise the relationship between text and model, I would 
like to give an idea of the extent of dissimulative advice and imagery 
before proceeding to their consequences for a reader of imitative 
literature. Practically all of the important doctrines and metaphors 
of imitation appear in Seneca's ep. mor. 84, so it should offer no 
surprise that he counsels dissimulation: "Let our mind hide [abscondat) 
all those things which have aided it and reveal only what it has produced" 
(7). This exhortation, which Macrobius takes so literally that he 
transfers it, along with other chunks o:f Seneca's letter, to his 
Saturnalia without any hint that he is using Seneca, appears just after 
the apian and digestive metaphors: Seneca is the first to link trans-
formation and dissimulation. 
Petrarch, while developing Seneca's comparison of the proper 
similarity between text and model to the resemblance of father to son, 
also dwells on dissimulation. He is writing to Boccaccio about the 
difficulty of avoiding unconscious verbal reminiscence and casting 
himself as father to Giovanni Malpaghini, his young secretary, who 
often inserts Virgilian phrases into his own poems. In this case the 
son turns out to be only too like his father; Giovanni produces a 
line from Petrarch's own Bucolicum Carmen as a justification for 
lifting a phrase from Virg-il. Petrarch' s unconscious reminiscence 
frustrates his attempt to conceal his models and leads him to reflect 
on the gap between intention and performance. Nevertheless the 
dissimulative advice is fundamental: 
12 
He will strengthen, I hope, his mind and style and will produce 
one thing, his very own, out of many things, and he will, I will 
not say flee, but conceal [celabit) the imitation so that he will 
appear similar to no one and will seem to have brought, from the 
old, something new to Latium [Latio intulisse]. (Fam. 23.19.10) 
Again one notices the combination of concealing and transforming: 
making something new from a variety of sources and then disguising the 
process that has produced it. Petrarch is following this advice, for 
his sentence conceals an allusion to a famous line of Horace: "Captured 
Greece captured the wild victor and brought arts to rustic Lati~m 
[intulit agresti Latio]" (epist. 2.1.156-7). A few lines later Petrarch 
restates his position on dissimulation: 
We must provide that although something is similar, much is 
dissimilar, and that the similarity itself lie hidden [latat), 
so that it cannot be perceived except by the silent searching of 
the mind, that it can be understood to be similar rather than 
said to be so. 
The exception of "the silent searching of the mind" allows for partial 
dissimulation. The relation between text and model is not necessarily 
to be obliterated or completely disguised; the possibility of alluding 
in order to be recognized is left open. 
Petrarch's last-quoted pronouncement on dissimulation stops 
just short of positing different responses by different audiences. Some 
later theorists take this step. Landino defines the purpose of 
imitation as "not to be the same as the ones we imitate, but to be 
13 
similar to them in such a way that the similarity is scarcely recognized 
17 
except by the learned." Sturm states this imitation for the learned 
doctrine succinctly: "Imitation lies hidden [ latet]; it does not stand 
out. It conceals [occultat] rather than reveals itself and does not 
wish to be recognized except by a learned man."18 
II 
What can these transformative and dissimulative metaphors 
tell someone who is trying to understand an imitative poem? What help 
do they offer a reader who confronts, for example, a passage in a Renaissance 
poem which strongly resembles one in a classical poem? What sort of 
expectations should such a reader have? Can one translate this advice 
for literary production into a guide for interpretation? On the basis 
of the transformative and dissimulative aspects of imitation,only one 
principle emerges. A reader must be very cautious in even calling 
a similarity between two texts an imitation or an allusion, much less in 
analyzing the use or significance of the similarity. 
This less than inspiring principle, which could be fairly 
stated much more skeptically, confronts one at every turn. First, 
transformation of the model into something new and different, especially 
when transformation is conceived as the means of hiding a text's relation 
to its model, calls into question the possibility of identifying the 
model. A thoroughly dissimulated transformation would not be understood 
even by "the silent searching of the mind"; the relation between text 
and model disappears. Or even if the relation is grasped by the 
learned, one wonders about a communicative intent that is so 
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carefully concealed. The relation may be crucial for understanding the 
text's genesis or the author's reading, but insignificant for an 
interpretation of the text itself. 
Even if a reader has identified a model or models, another 
problem of intent arises. One way to approach it is to examine a conflict 
implicit in the apian and digestive analogies as Seneca uses them: 
We too should imitate the bees; we should separate whatever we have 
gathered from diverse reading (for things held apart are better pre-
served), and then having carefully applied our intellect,we should 
mix those various sips into one taste, so that even if where it has 
been taken from appears, it will nevertheless appear other than where 
it has been taken from. We see that nature does this in our bodies 
without any effort on our part. (ep. mor. 84.5-6) 
The effortlessness of digestion makes all the difference. Does a 
similarity between text and model result from conscious intention 
the application of intellect -- or an unconscious process? The constant 
advice to digest or assimilate one's reading makes it highly probable 
that some unconscious absorption and reproduction will take place. 
Petrarch's story about Giovanni Malpaghini and the Virgilian 
phrase in Bucolicum Carmen 6 furnishes one instance of unconscious 
reminiscence. In Fam. 22.2.11-3 Petrarch provides a disturbingly 
persuasive analysis of the consequences of complete assimilation, 
although one must make some allowance for his obvious desire to 
impress Boccaccio with the paradox that an author is less likely to 
remember what he knows best. Petrarch distinguishes two classes of 
15 
reading which he has done. On the one hand he read authors like 
Ennius and Plautus only once and quickly at that; if he memorized 
anything of theirs, its alienness to his own thoughts made it stand 
in his memory as another's. On the other hand, he read and reread 
Virgil, Cicero, Horace, and Boethius. He digested their work so 
thoroughly that they entered his bone marrow, not just his memory. 
They became so much a part of his mind that occasionally their phrases 
came to his pen without his recognizing the source or even that they 
came from someone else. 19 
Petrarch's explanation of unconscious reminiscence offers 
particular difficulties because it casts doubts on just those texts to 
which one would suppose an author would allude. For one usually feels 
most confident calling a similarity bet~{een two texts an allusion when 
the putative model is a famous work or a work known to be familiar to 
the author of the "alluding" text. An analogue from everyday experience 
may help clarify Petrarch's explanation and also remove any suspicion 
that he is exaggerating to make a paradoxical, epigrammatic point. 
Most students have had an original idea that a later accident, for 
instance rereading lecture notes after some time has elapsed, has 
suddenly shown to have been their teachers', but the teaching had 
been so well digested by the students that it became a part of their 
thinking, not an element lodged in their memories. 
The counsel of a dissimulated imitation only to be understood 
by the learned suggests different kinds of function. Landino conceives 
the highest kind of poetry (Virgil, Dante) as written for the learned, 
so that a hidden allusion, just like the hidden allegory of Aeneid 1-6 
16 
which Alberti so subtly develops, probably has considerable 
significance. The fact of an imitation's concealment, therefore, does 
not necessarily imply absence of function. In other cases, however, the 
function may be no more than to allow the learned reader the pleasure of 
recognizing a phrase from an ancient poet. E. K., for example, in his 
dedicatory letter to Spenser Is Shepheardes Calender, mentions the poetic 
custom of first trying one's powers with pastoral poetry and cites some 
authors who followed this Virgilian progression, "whose fating this 
Author every IDere followeth, yet so as few, but they be wel sented 
can trace him out'' (p.418). This. cla.us.e rea,ds. li.ke a.n invitation to the 
learned to listen for echoes of ancient pastoralists. 
Besides the possibility of allusions only for the erudite, one 
may encounter allusions, plays on words, designed only for the author's 
pleasure -- another type of imitation that may not function in a work. 
Vida is explicit on this point: "Often I enjoy playing with and alluding 
to [alludere] phrases from the ancients and, while using precisely the 
same words, expressing another meaning."20 Pleasure for the learned 
or pleasure for the writer both may reduce imitation to a matter of 
genesis. I do not mean to belittle studies of genesis, but one cannot 
overlook the confusion created in failures to distinguish questions of 
genesis and function. 
The apian metaphor of eclectic gathering of vocabulary and the 
specific advice of ways to transform and disguise good phrases are 
symptomatic of a tendency in writings on imitation: the reduction of 
imitation to matters of elocutio. In his manuscript of Quintilian, 
next to 10.2.27, "Imitation, I will say again and again, is not merely 
a matter of words," Petrarch wrote himself a note, "Read and 
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remember, Silvanus."21 Both Quintilian and Petrarch, however, 
devote more theoretical energy to discussing style than inventio or 
dispositio. They are typical in exhorting writers to extend imitation 
beyond elocutio and in neglecting to do much more than exhort. Vida 
treats imitatio primarily as a matter of diction, although he offers 
the customary admonition to imitate the other two parts of rhetoric: 
"We appropriate in one instance their brilliant inventions, in another 
the order they employ" (3.214-5). He quickly returns to his main 
interest and shows himself an extremist by recommending the theft of 
"the words themselves." Ordinarily theft belongs to the vocabulary of 
failed transformation and is used to attack. Only Vida, to my knowledge, 
exalts theft into a term of praise, although one finds a hint in Macrobius 
22 (Sat. 6 .1.3).; In any case Vida's conception of imitation as theft, the 
extreme version of imitation as gathering stylistic beauties, indicates 
that some imitations are limited to style and do not bring the text and 
model into relation in any other way. 
So far an examination of the transformative and dissimulative 
aspects of imitation has produced only difficulties, all relating in 
some way to the major hermeneutical problem of the possibility and 
importance of assessing authorial intention. The discussions of 
imitation call into question the possibility of identifying 
models, or if the identity is agreed upon, the 
possibility of understanding the use of the model. No 
method for progressing from the observation of resemblance between 
two texts to an assertion of relation between them has yet emerged. 
So far there is very little evidence, from the theorists of imitation, 
lR 
to just.ify imitation as anything other than an element in the genesis 
of a text. The third class of analogies for imitation, however, 
eristic metaphors, does open the possibility of regarding an imitation 
as an important function of the text itself. 
III 
The two most striking eristic analogies I have found raise 
competition or strife to a necessary condition for creativity. In 
"Longinus'" original and stimulating discussion of imitation one 
finds this comment on Plato's indebtedness to Homer: 
Nor does it seem to me that he would have excelled so much 
in his philosophical doctrines or would have so often hit on 
poetical subject matter and expression, had he not, by God, 
I. 
with all his heart struggled with Homer for preeminence, like 
a young competitor against an already admired one, perhaps 
too contentiously and, as it were, breaking a lance with him, 
but nevertheless not without profit. For, according to Hesiod, 
"This strife [eris] is good for mortals." And truly this 
contest for the crown of glory is noble and most worth winning, 
in which even to be defeated by one's elders is not inglorious, 
(13. 4-5) 
This passage expresses a characteristic ambivalence about emulation. 
Plato's excellence as a philosophic author largely depends on his 
struggle with Homer, but nevertheless "Longinus" feels compelled to 
excuse the contentiousness and violence of the competition. "Longinus" 
shies away from analyzing the motives that lead to struggle and 
apparently feels some uneasiness about the competitive impulse 
despite its importance for attaining excellence. Consequently he 
19 
insists, by his quotation from Hesiod, that one can distinguish 
emulation or competition from strife andl contentiousness. 
The opening of the Works and I~ corrects what Hesiod had 
said about Eris in the Theogony: there are two kinds of Eris, a good 
and a bad. One stirs up war and suffering; the other stimulates men, 
even lazy men, to increase their substance out of a desire to compete 
with their neighbors, and "this eris is good for mortals." Up until 
this point one has a fairly simple opposition between bad and good, 
destructive and creative. The next two lines, however, show that the 
good, creative eris is not so benign as appeared at first: "And the 
I 
potter bears ill-will (I< oiE:Eo<] towards the potter and the carpenter to 
I . 
the carpenter, and the beggar envies [ fB•vu•] the beggar and the singer, 
the singer." Ill-will, malice, anger, envy, begrudging (kotos, 
phthonos) at first glance seem much more appropriate to the bad Eris. 
A recent and authoritative commentator on the passage, M. L. West, 
explains the discrepancy with reference to Hesiod's rather loose 
mental associations, "K~ios and f Dtf~.s are not in the spirit of the 
good Eris, but the idea of rivalry makes the lines relevant enough 
for Hesiod. ,;D I would like to suggest, however, that the appearance 
of kotos and phthonos reveals Hesiod' s ambivalence towards the 
distinction he is now drawing between two types of Eris. (After all 
he once recognized only the baleful Eris of the Theogony.) The odium 
figulinum, as Nietzsche calls it,24 points to the darker motivations 
of emulation and competition -- envy, malice. The distinction 
between the two kinds of Eris is more concerned with their effects; 
20 
they partially share motivations springing from some sort of ill-will. 
Even the good eris has a bad background. 
Regardless of his attitude towards it, emulation, the good 
eris, has for Hesiod associations less benevolent than its epithet 
would suggest. Hesiod does not try to excuse a connection of emulation 
with envy or malice, as does "Longinu~" "perhaps too contentiously." 
"Longinus" does not focus on the competitive component of emulation. 
Rather than analyze its motivations or mechanism, he envelops its 
workings in mystery by comparing it to the inspiration of the Pythian 
priestess. 
The other author who advocates competition as a necessary element 
of creativity gives a glimpse of the ferocity potentially latent in 
emulation. Calcagnini closes his letter to Giraldi with the story of 
the birth of Anteros75 Venus, worried why Cupid (Eros), her newly-born 
son, was not growing, asked Themis for advice. Themis replied that 
Cupid would grow if Venus had another son for Cupid to compete with. 
And after the birth of Anteros, Cupid, of course, had a growth spurt. 
Calcagnini draws the moral in the closing sentences of his letter: 
I think you will easily conclude from this story that no 
brilliant minds can make substantial progress unless they have 
an antagonist (as the Greeks say) with whom to struggle [quicum 
decertent] and wrestle. And it is necessary to contend [~­
tendamus] not only with our contemporaries, but also with those 
who wrote in the past, whom we call "silent teachers and masters" 
[mutos magistros). Otherwise we will always be speechless 
children [infantes]. (Trattati 1.220) 
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The myth of Anteros allows Calcagnini to justify strife in universal 
terms. The myth excuses violence and en~r as necessary for the 
formation of "brilliant .minds." Calcagini lets one detect the 
passage from admiring, reverent imitation to full-scale warfare with 
the admired master, for this mythical naturalization of violence 
follows the gladiatorial glee of overcoming inferiority. 
It is not only disgraceful but also dangerous for one old enough 
to be able to stand and walk to stick always to another's footsteps 
[vestigiis] and to use what Varro calls knee-splints, 26 since they 
do not easily become strong who walk with another's feet, fight with 
another's hands, see with another's eyes, speak with another's 
tongue, and who finally oblivious of themselves live with another's 
spirit. Now of course this is fine for those who have yet to come 
of age, who still eat baby food [~emanso cibo], whose limbs are 
still bound in swaddling bands. But those who are mature and whose 
muscles are stronger, let them now come out of the shade, let them 
now leap onto the field, let them no·w contend with the gladiator-
trainer himself whose precepts they used to receive, and let them 
try their strength with him and not yield, but rather press forward, 
putting it to the test whether they too can be commanders and by 
their own prowess [suo Marte] toss down their adversary from his 
position. (Trattati 1.219) 
The model, without whose help any progress is impossible, as Calcagnini 
says at the beginning of his letter, has become an adversary engaging 
the young author in a fight to the death. One detects the resentment 
of dependence not only in the gladiatorial and military imagery and 
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the sarcasm about baby food and swaddling bands. The repetition of 
another's conveys the rising frustration of the imitator, and the 
repetition of~ rings out like a battle cry of exhortation. This 
violence requires an explanation and receives it in the mythical 
moralization of Anteros; any possible malice, envy, ingratitude are 
ignored by the necessity of competition. 
Hesiod, "Longinus," and Calcagnini allow one to recognize 
envy and contentiousness as the dark side of emulation. Later I will 
suggest that this dark side plays an important role in preventing 
aemulatio from becoming a technical term for a particular type of 
imitation. But one must first try to show that a fairly clear con-
ception of aemulatio exists in some theorists even though they draw 
no explicit imitatio/aemulatio distinction. The passages from 
Calcagnini provide a good starting point, although they present 
unusually violent eristic imagery, because they contain the two most 
common classes of eristic analogy: decertent and contendamus in 
the Anteros myth; vestigiis in the second passage. Forms of certo 
and contendo usually advocate aemulatio, often in opposition to forms 
of sequor, a major term for imitation when not used to indicate a 
third kind of imitation called following. A cluster of images 
associated with paths-- via (or callis or a similiar word), dux, 
vestigium -- comprise the other class of eristic metaphor. Both 
classes are used to support both imitation and emulation, depending 
on the theorist's view of competition and the possibility of successful 
competition. 
The opening of Lucretius' third book offers the earliest example 
of an eristic opposition of sequor and certo/contendo. Lucretius is 
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invoking Epicurus: 
I follow [seguor] you, glory of the Greeks, and I place my 
footsteps [vestigia] firmly in your footprints, not desiring 
to compete [certandi cupidus], but because my love for you 
makes me long to imitate you. For why would the swallow 
contend [contendat] with swans? (3-7) 
Lucretius equates imitation with following the footsteps of his 
master and rejects emulation as contentious rivalry 
(''certandi cupidus11 ) and because of the futility of striving 
(contendat) with Epjcurus. This type of following rejects transformation 
of inventio; Lucretius' use of the bees as gatherers comes immediately 
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after the lines quoted above. 
Although one finds numerous examples of vestigia used to 
state a preference for imitatio over aemulatio, the other instances of 
the contendere I segui opposition all support emulation. Quintilian's 
28 brief discussion was probably the single most influential statement: 
But even those who do not seek the heights should contend 
rather than follow. For he who tries to be in front may equal 
even if he cannot surpass. No one, however, can equal the person 
whose footsteps he thinks he must tread in: for the follower 
will always of necessity be behind. (10.2.9-10) 
Quintilian is recommending aemulatio rather than imitatio and closes 
his chapter with another eristic term: "This will be their praise; 
they will be said to have surpassed their predecessors and to have 
taught their successors." 
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One of the few points of agreement between Pica and Bembo 
in their exchange of letters on imitation is a preference for striving 
to surpass rather than for following. Pica, after citing Plato's 
criticism of imitators and Horace's "servum pecus," asserts .J;:hat 
all good authors have sought fame by other means than imitation: 
"Rather, they have either opposed their predecessors in strenuous 
rivalry or striven to surpass them by a wide margin, not to follow 
them" (p. 25). Bembo agrees that surpassing the model should be the 
goal, but believes this best accomplished by devoting oneself to one 
model (Virgil for epic, Cicero for prose): "This can occur most easily 
if we imitate to the utmost the one whom we desire to surpass" (p. 56). 
Bembo is reversing Quintilian's statement that the follower must 
always be second. He continues by proposing the following "law": 
First, we should imitate the one who is best of all; next, we 
should imitate in such a way that we strive to overtake him; 
finally, all our effort should be devoted to surpassing him once 
we have overtaken him. Accordingly we should have in our minds 
those two outstanding accomplishers of very great matters, emulation 
and hope. But emulation should always be joined to imitation. 
(pp. 56-7) 
Pica and Bembo are coming very close to a dis.tinction between imitation 
and emulation. For Pica imitation brings no glory and is equivalent to 
following; rivalry and trying to surpass are superior. A few lines 
later Pica explicitly calls Virgil "an emulator of the ancients rather 
than an imitator," but not in the eristic sense he has just explained. 
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The third stage in Bembo's threefold "law of imitation" represents 
aemulatio. The sentences which follow, however, show that he does 
not regard it as a technical term, but rather as a feeling of 
admiring rivalry. 
The vestigia topos, perhaps the most common of the common-
places, can support both imitation and emulation. Statius uses it 
to express his admiration for Virgil and to admit his own sense of 
inferiority in his address to his book at the end of the Thebaid: 
"Do not touch the divine Aeneid, but follow from a distance and always 
adore its footsteps." Vida advises the aspiring poet to follow 
Virgil's footsteps: "Revere Virgil in your mind before all others, 
then; follow him only, and as far as you are able, keep to his 
footsteps" (1.208-9). In addition one finds numerous passages in 
which someone is praised or approved for following footsteps or is 
advised to do so in such authors as Seneca, Pliny, Longueil, Do let, 
Ricci, Parthenia, Ramus, As cham, Sturm,. and Harvey. 29 Typical of 
these usages is Giraldi's remark to Calcagnini, "I think that I have 
achieved enough, if I occasionally have been able to stick to Cicero's 
footsteps" (Trattati, 1.203). 
Petrarch, on the other hand, makes avoiding the footsteps 
of his predecessors a central principle of his conception of imitation, 
even though he recognizes the difficulty of the task (Fam. 23.19.15). 
In another letter to Boccaccio Petrarch reelaborates Seneca's vestigia 
topos; both passages also contain forceful examples of the use of dux 
and via (semita, callis)to prefer emulation to imitation: 
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What then? I will not go through the footsteps of predecessors? 
Indeed I will use the old road [via vetere], but if I discover a 
flatter and a more suitable one, I will open the way myself. The 
people who pondered these matters before us are not our masters 
but our leaders. (ep. mor. 33.11) 
What then? I like to follow the path [semitam] of predecessors, 
but not always another's footsteps. I am willing on occasion 
to borrow, not to steal from others' writings, but as long as I 
can, I prefer my own. I take pleasure in similarity, not 
identity, a similarity that is not excessive, in which the light 
of the follower's mind stands out, not his blindness or poverty. 
I think it better to do without a leader than to be forced to 
follow a leader through everything. I do not want a leader who 
binds me, but one who goes ahead; let me have my eyes with a 
leader, my judgment and freedom. I would not be prohibited 
from placing my foot where I wish and passing by elsewhere and 
trying the inaccessible. And I would be permitted to follow a 
shorter, or if I am so inclined, a flatter path [callem] and 
to hasten and to stop and to turn aside and to turn back. 
(Fam. 22.2.20-1?0 
Petrarch's expansion of these lines from Seneca is a good example of 
his persistent attempt to make his practice conform to his theory. 
He is following his own advice to abstain from reproducing someone 
else's phrasing (Fam. 23.19.13). He keeps only the common phrase, 
"What then?", which by itself alerts no one to this passage in Seneca. 
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He uses Seneca's figures -- footsteps, road, leader but changes 
the wording: "path of predecessors" for "footsteps of predecessors," 
"shorter or flatter" for "flatter and more suitable," ·semitam and 
~ for 'via. He preserves Seneca's general idea, but much 
more determindedly rejects servile follmving -- so much so that he 
seems defensive. He even corrects Seneca by implying he did not go 
far enough: the dismissal of masters is not enough. Petrarch wants 
a leader too, but feels that a leader is sometimes as oppressive 
as a master. His revision of Seneca's leader/master distinction con-
sequently contains implicit criticism of too facile an opposition in 
Seneca. Petrarch's own version of what emulation should be-- his 
statement of the attitude one should adopt towards a model --
presents a fine example of one common characteristic of emulation: 
( . 1' . ) . . . f h d 1 31 lmp lClt crltlClsm o t e mo e • 
IV 
The proliferation of eristic metaphors allows one to make a 
distinction :between imitation and emulation •. Although such 
a distinction is implicit in writings on imitation from Horace's epist. 
1.19 on, no one makes it explicitly, as far as I know, until Erasmus, 
who does not adopt emulation as a technical term. 32 Usually the 
distinction emerges in the metaphoric contrasts I have been tracing: 
servile/free (in Horace), follower/competitor or surpasser, thief/ 
borrower-transformer, ape/man. I would like to suggest that aemulatio 
does not emerge as a technical term for the freer, more competitive and 
transformative type of imitation at least partly because of its ambiguous 
33 
moral si5nificance. 
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Cicero's Tusculanae disputationes 4.17 gives two meanings 
of aemulatio: the imitation of virtue and the anxiety felt when one 
desires and lacks something which another possesses. Nonius defines 
the envious aspect of aemulatio by contrasting it with imitatio: 
Aemulatio differs from imitatio in that the latter is sincere 
and admits neither spite nor envy; the former, however, does 
have the eager application of imitating, but with malice added. 
(437M) 
Envy, contentious striving, jealous rivalry cling to aemulatio and 
and hinder its usefulness as a descriptive term; an overtone of 
condemnation threatens to interfere. In Pliny, for example, who uses 
aemulatio in literary contexts much more frequently than his predecessors, 
it does not acquire the status of a technical term contrasting with 
imitatio and occasionally requires an apology. In episL 1.2 Pliny 
is sending a speech to a friend for correction: 
I have tried to imitate IimitariJ Pemosthenes 1 ~!ways a £avorite 
of yours, and Calvus, recently- a £avorite o£ mine, at least in 
figures of speech; for the "few whom just •.... '' IJupi·ter loved: 
Aeneid 6,129] are ab~e to achieve [adsequi] the force of such men. 
Nor was the subject matter incompatible with this -- I fear I speak 
presumptuously [improbe] -- aemulatio. (2-3) 
Pliny here uses imitari, adsegui, and aemulatio interchangeably; he 
is following his models, not contending with them, imitating not 
emulating them. But when using aemulatio as a synonym for imitatio, 
he is afraid of laying himself open to a charge of &h~mele&~ne$$ 
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or presumption and excuses himself in accordance with rhetorical 
doctrine on using too daring an expression. At the conclusion of 
epist. 7. 9 Pliny is advocating aemulatio in translation. He explains 
that this certare, this contentio is bold but not shameless (improba) 
because it is a private exercise, not a public attempt to shine. In 
epist. 7.30 Pliny rejects the moral excess of aemulari for the 
neutral imitari and sequi. Once again emulating is improbum; he also 
calls it "paene furiosum" C'almost insane") • For Pliny aemulatio 
refers to the author's emotional attitude and motivation, not to a 
literary technique. 
Regardless of the reasons why aemulatio does not become a 
technical term, it has considerable usefulness as a designation for 
the type of imitation advocated by eristic metaphors. Erasmus, 
the first person to distinguish literary imitatio and aemulatio, 
uses eristic diction to make the distinction: 
Some shrewd people distinguish imitation from emulation. 
Imitation aims at similarity; emulation, at victory. Thus, 
if you take all of Cicero and him alone for your model, you 
should not only reproduce him, but also defeat him. He must 
not be just passed by, but rather left behind. (p. 116) 34 
Towards the end of his dialogue Erasmus returns to imitatio/aemulatio: 
Again, in this branch of study I want Cicero to be first and 
foremost, not the only one, and I do not think that one should 
only follow him, but rather imitate him and even emulate him. 
For the follower walks in the footsteps of another and is a 
slave to his model. Furthermore, it has been well said that 
a person who places his foot in the footstep of another 
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cannot walk well, and no one can ever swim well who does not 
dare to throw away the life preserver. An imitator, however, 
desires to say not so much the same things as similar ones --
in fact sometimes not even similar, but rather equal things. 
But the emulator strives to speak better, if he can. (p. 302) 
This reformulation shows the fluidity of boundaries among the types of 
imitation. Instead of a simple opposition one finds the fuller three-
fold progression: following, imitating, emulating. Following is 
rejected as clinging to a model's footsteps. Imitating no longer aims 
only at similarity, as in the previous passage, but rather at equality. 
Emulating still in a sense tries to achieve a victory, but the emphasis 
is shifted to producing something better. The difference between the 
two statements of aemulatio lies in the word~s potential ~mhivalence; 
striving to surpass (contentiousness) or striving to surpass (producing 
something better). 
This threefold division partially depends, I think, on a 
hidden metaphor of the path; following a forerunner, catching up 
with him, passing him. The division is also determined by the three 
logical possibilities of comparison: worse (less), equal, better 
(more). The middle term can quite easily drop out-- especially if 
one is thinking of the brief moment when a runner is alongside a 
competitor before passing him -- and leave a simple opposition 
behind/in front of, worse/better. And in fact this is what often 
happens in writings on imitation. Sometimes the more complete three-
fold scheme of following, imitating, emulating appears, and following 
is supposedly distinguished from imitating. Other times a simple 
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opposition appears -- follow/surpass, servile/free --, and imitating 
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and following are identified. One finds, for example, in Erasmus, 
besides the imitatio/ aemulatio opposition of the "shrewd people" and the later 
threefold scheme, an opposition betwt~en following and surpassing, in 
which the moment of overtaking is ignored. Bulephorus is describing 
,, 
Cicero's use of Demosthenes: He. was not content to ;i;ollow· Demosthenes 1 
but prndently chose to avoid some things and correct othe:t:s, and he emulated 
what he approved in s.uch. i'\ W.f\:Y th'\t hJ~. st);'oye. to su);"J?<;IS& :j.t'' (p, 1721.. 
Regardless of whether one d:l.stinguishes two or three 
species of imitation, aemulatio includes the attempt to surpass the 
model, and this attempt generally has: important consequences for a 
reader of imitative poetry because it: conflicts with dissimulative 
advice. Aemulatio calls attention to itself and deliberately 
challenges comparison with its model. The relation between text and 
model becomes an important element in the text itself. A passage from 
Vida shows how dissimulation and ~tlatio are mutually exclusive. 
He is discussing two possibilities for imitating the style of a model. 
Some can steal from refined poets and then hide the thefts; others 
make no attempt to conceal them. The refusal of dissimulation occurs 
in two cases; the second is aemulatio as libido certandi indicates: 
In other cases, aflame with a desire to compete with the ancients, 
they delight in vanquishing thent by snatching from their hands 
even material which has long been their peculiar possession, 
but which is, however, ill-fashioned, and improving it. (3. 228-30) 
The emulator tries not to disguise the relations between text and 
model because the reader cannot appreciate the victory over the model 
. h . . . 36 w1t out recogn1z1ng 1t. 
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What Vida is here saying about style can apply to matters of 
inventio and dispositio. The important point is that the rejection of 
dissimulation reduces and potentially eliminates some of the diffi-
culties raised by transformative and dissimulative doctrine. A 
reader can feel justified by this aspect of aemulatio in interpreting 
a resemblance between two texts as an allusion. A reader can feel 
justified in expecting a text to assert its difference from its model 
and to make use of that difference. 37 
In addition eristic metaphors suggest what kind of difference 
aemulatio may produce because the continual insistence on conflict 
suggests that a text may criticize, correct, or revise its model. For 
example, when Vida's emulator displays his improvement of another's 
elocutio, he passes judgment on the words as "ill-fashioned.'-' The 
emulator is correcting and criticizing his model. I have already 
pointed to the implicit criticism which Petrarch's assertion of his 
independence from a leader makes of Seneca's ~·-!!!£E·.33t Seneca does 
not recognize the danger that a leader may become a master. For 
explicit criticism joined to an imitation consider the following 
passage from Milton's Lycidas: 
Where were ye Nymphs when the remorseless deep 
Clos'd o'er the head of your lov'd Lycidas? 
For neither were ye playing on the steep, 
Where your old Bards, the famous Druids, lie, 
Nor on the shaggy top of Mona high, 
Nor yet where Deva spreads her wizard stream. 
Ay me, I fondly dream! 
Had ye been there -- for what could that have done? 
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Milton's lines follow the pattern set by the address to the nymphs in 
Theocritus' Idyll 1. 66-9 and its imitation by Virgil in Eclogue 10. 
9-12. Milton's last two lines, however, have no parallel. 
The self-criticism applies also to the models; 
the nymphs' presence would not have helped Daphnis or Gallus any 
more than Lycidas. Milton's reversal rebukes Theocritus and Virgil 
for escaping to a consoling fantasy of what might have been; they 
are no better than his "uncouth swain." These lines form an 
important part of Milton's emulative strategy to expose the 
inadequacy of pagan pastoral elegy as a response to death. 
At crucial moments in the poem Milton uses conventions of ancient 
pastoral in order to undermine and deprive them of their consoling 
power; by pointing out insufficiencies of pagan pastoral consolation, 
Milton clears the ground for the triumphant Christian consolation 
of Lycidas' reception in heaven. 
Lycidas also allows one to illustrate the difference between 
imitation and emulation. Although Milton criticizes the convention of 
addressing the nymphs, he imitates the procession of speakers, best 
seen in Theocritus Idyll 1 and Virgil's Eclogue 10. Milton certainly 
transforms the procession and uses it to structure the middle section 
of his poem, but he does not subvert it as he does the address to the 
nymphs. In Theocritus and Virgil the speakers come to console or 
sneer at the subjects of the lament, Daphnis and Gallus; the two 
ancient poems carefully set the scene around the subject and prepare 
the reader for a procession of visitors. Milton completely changes 
the situation. The procession receives no setting, and the speakers 
pass by the "uncouth Swain," the singer of the poem, not Lycidas. 
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Instead of preparing the reader for a procession Milton thrusts it 
abruptly into the poem. The reader is overhearing the lament over 
the impotence of poetry in the face of death, a lament which arises 
out of Calliope's inability to save Orpheus from dismemberment, 
when all of a sudden Phoebus Apollo interrupts this present interior 
monologue in the past tense -- interrupts the swain in the middle of 
a line, the only place in the poem where a full stop occurs in midline: 
"And slits the thin-spun life. 'But not the praise,' I Phoebus repli'd, 
and touch'd my trembling ears." Phoebus' intrusion is so startling --
it forces one to rethink the mode of presentation of the poem, which 
no longer appears a present lament, but a narrative of a past experience 
that one is unlikely to view it as part of the conventional pro-
cession of speakers. Milton is disguising his introduction of the 
convention; one does not recognize Milton's imitation until after 
the swain's comment on Phoebus' speech: 
But now my Oat proceeds, 
And listens to the Herald of the Sea 
That came in Neptune's plea. 
Then come Aeolus ("And sage Hippotades"), the river Cam ("Next Camus"), 
and St. Peter ("Last came"). In addition. imitating the processions 
of Theocritus and Virgil gives Milton "occasion," as he remarks in 
the headnote to the 1645 edition of his Poems in a proud assertion 
of post-eventum prophecy, to attack "our corrupted Clergy." St. 
Peter's speech departs considerably from the spirit of previous 
pastoral elegies, but the digression appears natural as a speech by 
a member of the procession. Just as Milton transforms the introduction 
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of his procession into the intrusion of Apollo, he transforms the 
final speech into a topical criticism of the church. Nevertheless 
he does not direct his criticism towards the convention he is 
transforming and consequently is imitating rather than emulating. 
A final passage from Lycidas illustrates another aspect of 
emulation. Unlike the note of criticism or correction, the eristic 
component of emulation, this aspect is not always present. I am 
referring to an exploitation of the historical distance between a 
text and its model. Awareness of the historical otherness of the 
model leads in these cases to crucial departures from, sometimes 
criticisms of, the model. Erasmus is the only theorist to confront 
explicitly the significance of historical change for imitation and to 
ground his conception of imitation in his awareness of change. 
Erasmus bases his attack against strict Ciceronianism, the 
doctrine that one can achieve an excellent Latin style by restricting 
oneself only to Ciceronian usage and style, on an argument which one 
may call historical decorum. As the full title of Erasmus' work 
indicates, Dialogus cui titulus Ciceronianus sive de optima dicendi 
genere, Erasmus is concerned with achieving as good a style as possible. 
He argues that people want to be Ciceronian because that appellation 
means they are excellent speakers or writers, since everyone agrees 
that Cicero is the consummate Latin stylist. A good stylist, there-
fore, writes or speaks like Cicero. In addition no one speaks well 
who does not ebserve decorum, a proposition which anyone trained in 
classical and Renaissance rhetoric would surely approve. Erasmus 
asserts that one speaks with decorum (apte), "if our speech suits the 
people and conditions of the present [praesentibus]" (p. 124). 
Erasmus' interpretation of praesentibu~:, which he refers to the general 
historical conditions of the present instead of the specific 
circumstances of the delivery of a speech, allows him to assert 
the paradox that one must be unlike Cicero to be like Cicero: 38 
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Does the present situation of this century seem to correspond 
with the ways of those times in which Cicero lived and spoke, 
since the religion, governmental power, magistracies, common-
wealth, laws, customs, pursuits, the very appearance of men 
really just about everything -- have changed radically? 
Furthermore, since everywhere the entire scene of human events 
has been turned upside down, who today can observe decorum in 
his speech unless he greatly differs from Cicero? . • . Wherever 
I turn, I see everything changed, I stand on another stage, I 
see another theatre, even another world. (p. 126) 
For Erasmus the primary duty of the imitator is to be aware of the 
differences between his own day and antiquity, in particular to 
recognize the moral and stylistic revolution of Christianity, and to 
adapt the writings of the past to the conditions of the present. 
Historical decorum requires that the imitator found his style on the 
insight, "I see everything changed." 
The conclusion of Lycidas shows how even the significance of the 
sun has changed since antiquity. The rising and setting of the sun no 
longer mock men with their perpetual recurrence, thereby insisting on 
man's mortality; for the Christian it recalls the resurrection which 
39 
follows death and provides natural reassurance of immortality. 
Bion's Epitaph 99-104 introduces into pastoral elegy a contrast between 
37 
the natural cycles of recurrence in nature and the finality of human 
death. Some such contrast becomes conventional in later pastoral, 
for example, in Sannazaro and Marot. Castiglione and his imitator 
William Drummond substitute the sun's rising and setting for the 
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vegetational cycles of Bion's Epitaph. The topos receives its most 
concise, and perhaps most poignant, expression in a famous poem 
outside of the pastoral tradition: "The sun can set and return; 
once our brief light sets, we must sleep an eternal night" (5.4-6). 
Catullus states the contrast and then ignores it; it introduces death 
too forcefully and would spoil the tone of the poem if elaborated. The 
sun represents an abyss between the huma:n and natural worlds. 
Milton's consciousness of the change which Christianity 
produces in world history allows him to use the natural world as an 
analogy for the human and to reverse the traditional contrast of pastoral 
elegy: 
Weep no more, woeful Shepherds weep no more, 
For Lycidas your sorrow is not dead, 
Sunk though he be beneath the wat'ry floor, 
So sinks the day-star in the Ocean bed, 
And yet anon repairs his drooping head, 
And tricks his beams, and with new-spangled Ore, 
Flames in the forehead of the morning sky: 
So Lycidas, sunk low, but mounted high, 
Through the dear might of him that walk'd the waves ... 
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The rising and setting of the sun become a confirmation of the 
resurrection. This moment of Christian transcendence makes the 
traditional contrast and its assertion of human mortality obsolete; 
the conditions of the Christian present have made the older poetic 
convention outmoded. Lycidas triumphs over death as Lycidas 
triumphs over previous pastorals which fail to realize that the rising 
of the sun guarantees immortality, not eternal death. Milton's ~­
star stands as a silent rebuke to earlier elegies, Castiglione's and 
Drummond's for example, which fall into the contradiction of coupling 
a Christian vision of resurrection with human exclusion from the 
cyclical return of the sun. 
Three versions of imitation have emerged from this study --
versions, not hard and fast categories with immutable boundaries --· 
following, imitation, and emulation. Following or nontransformative 
imitation is the gathering or borrowing of phrases, sentences, passages 
which amounts to a transcription of the model(s) into the text. Following 
includes Vida's insertion of random Virgilian tags into his poems and 
Macrobius' appropriation of Seneca's ~· ~· 84. A certain amount of 
transforming occurs by virtue of inclusion in a new context, and 
complete transcription without changing a word is very rare indeed. 
Consequently one occasionally has difficulty distinguishing following 
from imitation, in which the note of transformation is strong. In an 
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imitation the differences between text and model are at least as 
pronounced as the resemblances, as in Milton's procession of speakers 
in Lycidas. Critical reflection on or correction of the model 
distinguishes emulation or eristic imitation from (transformative) 
imitation, and this criticism is often grounded in an awareness of the 
historical distance between present and past, as in Milton's comparison 
of Lycidas' and the sun's resurrection. 
NOTES 
1. The most thorough discussion of imitation is Hermann Gmelin, 
"Das Prinzip der Imitatio in den romanischen Literaturen der 
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Renaissance," Romanische Forschungen 46 (1932), 83-360. See also 
Charles Lenient, De Ciceroniano bello apud recentiores (Paris, 
1855), Remigio Sabbadini, Storia del ciceronianismo e di altre 
guestioni letterarie nell'eta della rinascenza (Torino, 1885), 
Eduard Norden, Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. 
his in die Zeit der Renaissance5 (Darmstadt. 1958), pp. 773-81, 
John Edwin Sandys, Harvard Lectures on the Revival of Learning 
(Cambridge, 1905), although his chapter, "The History of 
Ciceronianism," pp. 145-73, is largely dependent on Sabbadini, 
Richard HcKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Conception of Imitation 
in Antiquity," Modern Philology 34 (1936), 1-35, Ferruccio Ulivi, 
L'imitazione nella poetica del rinascimento (Milano, 1959), Cesare 
Vasoli, "L'estetica dell'Umanesimo e del Rinascimento," in Homenti 
e problemi di storia dell'estetica, parte prima (Hilano, 1959), esp. 
pp. 345-54, 380-3, Nancy S. Struever, The Language of History in 
the Renaissance: Rhetoric and Historical Consciousness in Florentine 
Humanism (Princeton, 1970) pp. 147 ff; Elaine Fantham, "Imitation 
and Evolution: The Discussion of Rhetorical Imitation in Cicero 
De oratore 2.87-97 and Some Related Problems of Ciceronian Theory" 
and "Imitation and Decline: Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the 
First Century After Christ," Classical Philology 73 (1978), 1-16, 
102-16. The best discussion of the interaction between the theory 
and practice of imitation and of the type of reading which imitative 
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literature requires is Thomas M. Greene,. "Petrarch and the Humanist 
Hermeneutic," in Italian Literature: Roots and Branches, ed. Giose 
Rimanelli and Kenneth John Atchity (New Haven, 1976), pp. 201-24. 
I am greatly indebted to Greene's work on imitation. 
2. See, for example, A. J. Smith, "Theory and Practice in Renaissance 
Poetry: Two Kinds of Imitation," Bulletin of the John Rylands 
Library 4 7 (1964), 212-43. 
3. De imitatione libri tres (Venice, 1545), p. 43v. Unless otherwise 
indicated all translations are my own. 
4. The boundaries between the types of imitation are fluid in some 
theorists, and in practice it is often difficult to distinguish 
precisely imitation from emulation or following. Consequently I 
use imitation to designate both the larger class and one member 
of it. I fear that greater terminological precision, although 
perhaps more convenient, would result in too rigid a system of 
classification. 
5. Compare the fine discussion of the tension between Du Bellay's 
reverence for the ancients and his impulse towards iconoclasm in 
Margaret W. Ferguson, "The Exile's Defense: Du Bellay's La Deffence 
et illustration de la langue fran$oyse," ~ 93 (1978), 275-89. 
6. Jiirgen v. Stackelberg, "Das Bienengleichnis: Ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte der literarischen Imitatio," Romanische Forschungen 
68 (1956), 271-93. 
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7. Nevertheless Macrobius does change what he finds in Seneca. The 
most revealing additions are quoted in the text, but are not the 
only ones. The comparison at Sat. l.pr.8 does not come from Seneca. 
Macrobius also omits large portions of Seneca's letter: the 
digression on natural history, the contrast between father/son and 
man/imago, the "magni vir ingenii" who impresses his own form on 
what he draws from others. The omission of the "magni vir ingenii" 
may be due to Macrobius' modesty (cf. his own concern over his 
ability to write good Latin, sectionsll ff), but it might reflect 
his shift of emphasis from transformation to orderly management: 
he does not want his material to be unrecognized, as Seneca asserts 
can happen. Also, the resemblance of father to son is irrelevant 
to Macrobius' redisposition. Consequently, Petrarch's criticism is 
not entirely just: "non enim flares apud Senecam lectos in favos 
vertere studuit, sed integros et quales in alienis ramis invenerat, 
protulit~' (Le Familiari, ed Vittorio Rossi and Umberto Bosco 
[Firenze, 1933-42], 1.8.3-4). Cf. Erasmus' criticism of Macrobius' 
centones, Il Ciceroniano, ed. Angiolo Gambara (Brescia, 1965), p. 204. 
8. Macrobius excuses his reproduction of others' words as follows: 
"nee mihi vitio vertas, si res quas ex lectione varia mutuabor 
ipsis saepe verbis quibus ab ipsis auctoribus enarratae sunt 
explicabo; quia praesens opus non eloquentiae ostentationem, sed 
43 
noscendorum congeriem pollicetur" (1. pr. 4). Borrowing and its 
unscrupulous cousin, theft, like culling flowers, are frequent 
images of nontransformative imitation or following. 
~. "Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano et Stat:ii Sylvis," in Prosatori 
latini del Quat:trocento ~ ed .. Eugenio Girdn (Milano and NapoLi.,, 
1952), p. 878. The lines from Lucretius are 3.11-2. 
10, See the letter to Cortesi, Prosatori, pp. 902-4. 
11. I list a few more instances of apian metaphors in nontransformative 
contexts to show their general diffusion in the Renaissance, since 
the reader of von Stachelberg's collection of Bienengleichnisse 
receives the impression that only medieval authors use them to support 
advice to gather material from a wide variety of sources. Giovam-
battista Giraldi Cinzio, "Super imitatione epistula," in Trattati 
di poetica e retorica del Cinqueeento, ed. Bernard Weinberg (Bari, 
1970-4), vol. 1, pp.l99-200, cites the metaphor as a typical 
argument for eclectic imitation against Ciceronianism. Ronsard 
uses the metaphor at least four times in connection with gathering. 
The most revealing case is "Sonnet, a M. des Caurres, sur son livre 
de Miscellanees," in which Ronsard praises the compiler of a 
florilegium; see Oeuvres completes, ed. Gustave Cohen (Paris, 1950), 
vol. 2, pp. 942-3. The other instances may be found, vol. 2, pp. 
390-1, 614, 862 (I owe these references to Grahame Casto\ Pleiade 
Poetics: A Study in Sixteenth Century Thought and Terminology 
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[Cambridge, 1964], p. 72). See also Petrus Ramus,Ciceronianus 
(Paris, 1557), p. 18, and M. Antonius Muretus, Variarum Lectionum 
libri viii (Venice, 1559), book 8, chap. 1. 
12, See the letter to Poliziano, Prosatori, p. 910. 
;1,3., Quintilian 10.1.19; Macrobius, Sat. 1. pr. 7. 
-- ' 
Petrarch, 
Fam. 22.2.12, Seniles 2.3; Poliziano, Prosatori, p. 904; Erasmus 
pp. 176, 178, 290 (quoted below), 300; Celio Calcagnini, "Super 
imitatione commentatio," Trattati 1.213; Etienne Dolet, De 
Imitatione Ciceroniana, in Emile V. Telle, L'Erasmianus sive 
Ciceronianus d'Etienne Dolet (1535) (Geneve,l974), pp. 18, 
63, 76, 91; Francesco 'Florido,, Succisi'Varum 
lectionum libri tres (Basel, 1539), p. 126• Du Bellay, La Deffence 
et illustration de la langue francoyse, ed. Henri Chamard 
(Paris, 1970), p. 42; Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie, in 
Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. Gregory Smith (Oxford, 1904), 
vol. 1, p. 203; "Timber," Ben Jonson, ed. C. H. Herford, Percy 
and Evelyn Simpson, vol. 8 (Oxford, 1947), p. 638. --
In order not to burden the text unnecessarily I will here list some 
examples of the monkey and crow metaphors, which always (with the 
exception of Villani, who calls Salutati "scimmia di Cicerone" 
as a compliment) are used pejoratively to indicate particularly 
slavish, nontransformative imitation. For the ape see Horace, 
sat. 1.10.18; Seneca the Elder, contr. 9.3. 12-3; the three ancient 
and numerous medieval uses of simia cited by Ernst Robert Curtius, 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, tr. Willard R. Trask 
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(Princeton, 1953), pp. 538-40; Fillipo Villani, Le vite d' uomini 
illustri fiorentini, cited by Gambaro ,. Ciceroniano, p. xxxii; 
Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.13; Poliziano, Prosatori, p. 902; 
Cortesi, Prosatori, p. 906 and "De hominibus doctis dialogus," 
in Philippi Villani Liber de civitatis Florentiae famosis 
civibus, ed. Gustavus Camillus Galetti (Firenze, 1847), p. 234; 
Pico, Le epistole "De imitatione" di Giovanfrancesco Pico della 
Mirandola e di Pietro Bembo, ed. Giorgio Santangelo 
(Firenze, 1954), pp. 29, 63, 70, 71; Erasmus, with whom 
simius is a favorite term of mockery, pp. 86, 100, 108, 118, 136, 
etc.; Sperone Speroni, Opere (Venice, 1740), vol. 2, p. 365 (joined 
with a crow comparison); Du Bellay, p .. 107; Gabriel Harvey, 
Ciceronianus, ed. Harold S. Wilson (Lincoln, 
1945), p. 80, alluding to Erasmus, p. 100. Horace, epis. 1. 3 .19, 
reworks the Aesopian fable of the crow and the stolen plumage to 
dissuade Celsus from plundering the Palatine library for his 
writings. After Horace, the cornicula becomes a connnonplace: 
Petrarch, Fam. 22.2;17; Pico, p. 34: Erasmus, p. 204; Calcagnini, 
Trattati 1.216; Speroni 2.365; Ricci, p. 75; Johann Sturm, De 
imitatione oratoria (Strassbourg, 157lj.), schola to book 3, chap. 
1; Harvey, p. 5q (perhaps alluding to Ricci). 
14· Ciceroniano, P• 290. The representatlve nature of this passage 
is highlighted by the fact that it is one of the very few passages 
of which Do let, in his attack on Erasmus (p. 91), approves ... 
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15. See my "Imitation and the Renaissance Sense of the Past: The 
Reception of Erasmus' Ciceronianus," forthcoming in The Journal 
of Medieval and Renaissance Studies. 
16. Seneca, ~ ~· 84. 8; Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.11; Cortesi, 
Prosatori, pp. 906 (quoted by Erasmus, p. 298), 908. Pico 
criticizes Cortesi's comparison, p. 63. 
17. Because of the inaccuracies of the printed editions of the 
Disputationes Camaldulenses I translate from the manuscript, 
writtenby Pietro Cennini in 1474, preserved in the Laurentian 
Library (Plut. 53.28). This passage appears f. l97v. 
18. Deimitatione oratoria 2.3. Of all the theorists of imitation 
Sturm is the most insistent on dissimulation, which finds a place 
in his theory from his earliest days (see Nobilitas Literata [1538; 
ed. Philip MUller, Jena, 1680], p. 69). By the time of his major 
work on imitation, De imitatione aratoria (1574), he has elaborated 
a sixfold scheme for dissimulation which he calls "occultationis 
partes" (book 3, chap. l). Bernardino Parthenio, Della imitatione 
poetica (Venice, 1560), p. 48, offers specific advice on methods 
of dissimulation, but not in as great detail as Sturm. 
19. Compare Montaigne on his memory in "De la praesumption," Oeuvres 
completes, ed. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris, 1962), 
p. 635: "Je feuillette les livres, je ne les estudie pas: ce qui 
m'en demeure, c'est chose qu je ne reconnois plus d'estre d'autrui; 
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c'est cela seulement dequoy mon jugement a faict son profict, les 
discours et les imaginations dequoy il s'est imbu; l'autheur, le 
lieu, les mots et autres circonstances, je les oublie incontinent." 
Cicero, de oratore 2.59-60, uses sunburn as a metaphor for 
unintentional influence, and E. K., in his dedicatory letter to 
Gabriel Harvey, uses Cicero's comparison to defend Spenser's 
archaic diction: "In whom [older English authors) whenas this our 
Poet hath bene much traveiled and throughly redd, how could it be, 
(as that worthy Oratour sayde) but that walking in the sonne 
although for other cause he walked, yet needes he mought be sun-
burnt; and having the sound of those auncient Poetes still ringing 
in his eares, he mought needes in singing hit out some of theyr 
tunes. But whether he useth them by such casualtye and custome, 
or of set purpose and choyse •.. " (Spenser, Poetical Works, 
ed. J. C. Smith and E. de Selincourt [Oxford, 1912), p. 416). 
Compare Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique (1560), ed. G. H. 
Mair (Oxford, 1909), p. 5. I owe these references to sunburn to 
David Kalstone, Sidney's Poetry: Contexts and Interpretations 
(Cambridge, 1965), p. 191, n. 21. 
20. The "De Arte Poetica" of Marco Girolamo Vida, ed. and tr. 
Ralph G. Williams (New York, 1976), 3. 257-8. I quote Williams' 
translation here and elsewhere with an occasional modification. 
21. Quoted by Pierre de Nolhac, Petrargue et l'humanisme (Paris, 1907), 
vol. 2, p. 92. De Nolhac, p. 91, shows that Silvanus is a name 
Petrarch often used for himself. 
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22. Cf. Sturm, De imitatione aratoria 1.11. For theft and imitation 
see Eduard Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur 
(Leipzig and Berlin,l912) and Harold Ogden White, Plagiarism and 
Imitation during the English Renaissance: A Study in Critical 
Distinctions (Cambridge, 1935). 
23. Hesiod, Works and Days, ed. M. L. West (Oxford, 1978), p. 147. 
24. 6 See "Homers Wettkampf," in Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke, ed. Karl 
Schlechta (Munchen, 1969), vol. 3, p. 294. Nietzsche, however, 
argues that Hesiod's conception of the value of envy is typically 
Greek and alien to moderns. 
25. Robert V. Merrill, "Eros and Anteros," Speculum 19 (1944), 274ff, 
discusses this passage and Calcagnini' s Anteros sive d.e mutuo amore. 
26, Weinberg prints "semper astris" instead of the correct "serper-
astris"; see Caelius Calcagninus, Opera (Basel, 1544), p. 275. 
Calcagnini is referring to Varro, de lingua latina 9.11. 
27. In other passages, however, Lucretius asserts the originality of 
treating such difficult subjects in Latin verse by reversing the 
vestigia topos: "avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante I trita 
solo" (1.926-7=4.1-2). For similar assertions of originality see 
Virgil, Geo. 3.289-94, and Horace, epist. 1.19.21-2 and ars poetica 
285-8. 
28. For a formulation dependent on Quintilian see Daniel Barbaro, 
"Della eloquenza," Trattati 2.359. 
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29. Seneca, ep. mor. 79.16; Pliny, epist. 6.11.2; Longueil, quoted by 
Telle, L'Erasmianus, p. 313; Dolet, p. 66; Ricci, p. 66v; 
Parthenia, pp. 65, 87; Ramus, p. 78; Ascham, letter to Sturm, 
The Whole Works of Roger Ascham, ed. Giles (London, 1864), 
pp. 180, 181; Sturm, Nobilitas LitHrata, p. 23; Harvey, pp. 82, 102. 
30. In my opinion there is no doubt that Petrarch is emulating the 
passage from Seneca rather than just using a topo§. Petrarch 
refers to ep. mor. 33.7, a section against "captare flosculos," 
in three different letters (Fam. 1.3.4, 4.15.17, 24.1.9). The 
second of these letters contains a long exhortation, based 
on Senec-a, not to excerpt and paraphrases the via and vestigia 
sentence: "Placet ignota tentare, ubi sepe viam non inveniens 
aut vageris aut corruas; placet illorum segui vestigia ..• " 
(4.15.18). For Petrarch 1 s thorough acquaintance with Seneca, 
especially the letters to Lucilius, see de Nolhac, vol. 2, pp. 
115-26. It is ironic that Petrarch is violating his own advice 
against "captare flosculos" and excepting from commentaries in 
Fam. 22. 2; his quotation from Lucre:tius comes from Macrobius 
(Sat. 6.2.3). Petrarch, as de Nolhac, val. 1, pp. 159-60 shows, 
has no first-hand knowledge of Lucretius. 
31. One final vestigia topes deserves citation because at least two 
other authors-- Erasmus,pp. 296, 302 (quoted below), and Parthenia, 
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p. 107 -- approve and quote it. I refer to Poliziano's (Prosatori, 
p. 904): "Sed ut bene currere non potest qui pedem ponere studet 
in alienis tan tum vestigiis, ita nee bene scribere qui tamquam de 
praescripto non audet egredi." A few examples of dux to 
advocate or approve close imitation: Petrarch, Fam. 24.4.4-5; 
24.7.3; 24.9.1; 24.12,3,18,22,23,24,42; Cortesi, Prosatori pp. 906, 
910; Bembo, pp. 51,54, Dolet, p. 56; Ascham, letter to Sturm, 
p, 182; Levin to Harvey, Ciceronianus, p. 38. One finds path 
used similarly in Bembo, p. 56; Vida 3.185; Dolet, p. 66. 
Quintilian (10.5.7), Pico (p. 26), and Levin (Harvey, p. 38) 
via to support emulation. 
32. Arno Reiff, interpretatio, imitatio, aemulatio: Begriff und 
Vorstellung literarischer Abhangigkeit bei den Romern (diss. 
Koln, 1959),pp. 73ff, claims that aemulatio becomes a fixed 
critical term in the age of Tiberius. The evidence does not 
use 
bear him out. Phaedrus' use of aemulatio, 2 ep. 7, is more 
plausibly explained as moral rather than technical; his prologues 
and epilogues are obsessed with envy and the criticism he may 
receive (calumniari, 1. prol. 5; livor, obtrectare, 2 ep. 10; 
livor, 3. prol. 60; obtrectare 4. prol. 15-6; livor, 4.22.1; 
invidia, 5. prol. 9). But the major objections to taking 
aemulatio as a designation for a type of imitation are that it 
often appears as a synonym for imitatio and that Quintilian in 
10.2 and Seneca in~· mor. 84, the two most extended and most 
important discussions of imitation in the first century (and 
perhaps in any other), discussions which Reiff curiously neglects, 
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do not use aemulatio, although they are advocating it. Quintilian's 
only use of aemulari in 10.2 occurs at section 17 in a list of 
imitators who fall into the vitia nearest to the virtutes of their 
models; the context shows that he is just varying his verbs, not 
using a technical term. At 10.1.61 Quintilian refers to Horace's 
"Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari" (Od. 4.2.1.) as follows: 
"propter quae Horatius eum meritO nemini credit imitabilem." 
And Pliny, who frequently has aemulor and aemulatio to describe 
literary relationships, often uses it synonomously with imitatio, 
for instance in epist. 1.2.2-3 and 1.5.12-3, as Reiff admits (p. 85), 
and 8.6.13. At 6.11.2 Pliny makes aemulari and "meis instare 
vestigiis" synonomous. Pliny's joining of improba with aemulatio 
at 1.2.3 and 7 .30.5 suggests that he has its ambiguous moral 
significance, not a technical literary one, in mind. I do not 
question the existence of varying eonceptions of imitation in the 
first century, nor do I challenge the usefulness of aemulatio to 
describe one of them, provided that one realizes that it is not 
an ancient technical term. (For similar criticisms of Reiff, see 
the review by Manfred Fuhrmann, Gnomon 33 [1961], 445-8). Several 
classicists make a distinction between imitatio and aemulatio. 
See, for example, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Sappho und 
Simonides: Untersuchungen tiber griechische Lyriker (Berlin, 
1913), p. 323; Falco Martinazzoli, Sapphica et Vergiliana: Su alcuni 
temi letterari della tradizione poetica classica (Bari, 
1958), esp. "Introduzione: imitazione, emulazione, originalita," 
pp. 7-31; G.M.A. Grube, The Greek and Roman Critics (Toronto, 
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1965), p. 211. In particular see Gordon Williams' fine discussion 
of imitatio and aemulatio in postvirgilian epic, Change and Decline: 
Roman Literature in the Early Empire (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1978), pp. 193-213. 
33. Cf. Giorgio Pasquali, Orazio lirico (Firenze, 1920) 
pp. 119-23. 
34. One would like to know who these shrewd people are. Does 
Erasmus have particular people in mind, is he referring to an 
idea "in the air," or is he just being casual without intending 
to suggest anyone? As observed earlier, Pico and Bembo come 
closest to making a distinction between imitatio and aemulatio. 
Perhaps Erasmus heard such a distinction during his stay in Rome 
in 1509, during which visit he heard the Ciceronian sermon which 
alarmed him so much (see Ciceroniano, p. lvii-lviii and pp. 128ff). 
In any event Erasmus claims that he did not know the correspondence 
between Pica and Bembo until after the publication of the 
Ciceronianus: see the letter to Vlatten, 24 January 1529, 
Ciceroniano, p. 326. 
35. Ricci's sequi/imitari/aemulari distinction, quoted in the 
introduction to this paper, may be indebted to 
Erasmus, although it also recalls Bembo's above-quoted progression 
from imitandum to assequi contendamus to praetereamus. A member 
of Bembo's circle in Venice, Daniel Barbaro, in his "Della 
eloquenza" (1557) also offers a threefold division of imitation: 
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"Et in brieve, bisogna aprir gli occhi e nello imitare i dotti et 
eccellenti uomini si richiede considerare di che forma essi sieno 
pi~ abondanti e di che meno, acci6 che sapendo per qual cagione 
essi stati sieno tali, ancora non sia tolto i1 potere agli 
studiosi di accostarsi loro, et aguagliarli, e se possibile e 
(che pure e possible al modo gia detto) di superargli" (Trattati 
2, 450). With these tripartite divisions of imitation 
contrast Sturm's opposition between servile and free imitation, 
De imitatione aratoria 1.2. 
36, Seneca the Elder and Macrobius both appear to recognize a 
dissimulative and nondissimulative type of imitation. Seneca is 
commenting on imitations of the Virgilian phrase, "plena deo," 
(which does not appear in our texts of Virgil). He reports that Ovid 
liked the phrase and transposed it to his Medea: ·~n subripiendl causa, 
sed palam mutuandi, hoc animo lllt vellet agnosci" (suas. 3, 7). In 
Macrobius Sat. 1.24.18 Eustathius briefly contrasts Virgil's two 
methods of imitation: artifex .dissimulatio and professa imitatio. 
Neither Seneca nor Macrobius is referring to emulation. 
37. Aemulatio, of course, is no panacea; difficulties remain. The 
reader starts with a resemblance between texts, not a guide 
pointing to emulations as opposed to imitations. Even if the 
author, Petrarch, Poliziano, or Jonson, for example, has 
expressed a preference for emulation, there is no guarantee that 
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he may not borrow a phrase here and there in a nontransformative, 
nonemulative fashion. For authors who have not written on 
imitation/emulation one can only try to deduce from their work 
which type of imitation they generally approve and practice. 
Also, it is difficult to be sure whether an emulation is striving wi 
the structure, themes, premises of its model or only striving 
with the expression; the emulation may not extend beyond a 
stylistic trick, as often in Vida. Frequently a major inter-
pretive difficulty arises in trying to determine if an emulation 
is reworking a particular passage or a topos; one is not sure 
just what is being contended with. I hope to elaborate these 
points in a future study. 
38. Later Erasmus eliminates the paradox by suggesting that Cicero 
redivivus would adapt himself to the stylistic standards of the 
present. See Ciceronian~ , p. 274. 
39. For Christian sun imagery and typology see Hugo Rahner, 
Griechische Mythen in christlicher Deutung3 (Zurich, 
1966), pp. 89ff, and Franz Joseph Dolger, Sol Salutatis: Gebet 
und Gesang in christlichem Altertum2 (Munster, 
1925), esp. "Jesus als Sonne der Auferstehung und Sol Invictus," 
pp. 364ff. Donne's "Good Friday, 1613. Riding Westward" 
contains a pointed example: 
There [in the east] I should see a sun, by rising set, 
And by that setting endless day beget; 
But that Christ on this Cross, did rise and fall, 
Sin had eternally benighted all. 
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The pun son (of God) I sun inspires numerous passages of English 
religious poetry in the Renaissance. 
40. Sannazaro, Arcadia, "Eclogue" 11.55-63; Marot, "Complaincte de 
Madame Loyse de Savoye" 177-80; Castiglione, "Alcon" 54-64; 
Drummond, "Alcon" 37-44. All these poems may be found in the 
convenient collection, The Pastoral Elegy: An Anthology, ed. 
Thomas Perrin Harrison (1939; New York, 1968). 
